and rent regulations, that enable some low-income households to resist displacement pressures; these policies have always been attacked as counterproductive market distortions' by progentrification advocates, who now point to the new evidence to claim that gentrification is a rising tide that lifts all boats.
Displacement remains a serious problem in cities of the Global North. In each of the nationwide samples of the American Housing Survey (AHS) in 2003, 2005, and 2007 (US Bureau of the Census, 2008a), about 1.7 million renter households cited at least one involuntary reason for moving in the previous yearöforced to move because of housing costs, eviction, natural disaster, private landlord displacement, or government displacement. In this paper we analyze these pressures in New York City, where market dynamics are mediated by comparatively strong public housing and rent regulation, and where a unique data source permits analysis at a fine spatial scale. First, we review the displacement debates, with an emphasis on the politics of measurement. Then we undertake an analysis of displacement in the city from 2002 to 2008. We use simple statistical techniques in conversation with findings from approximately thirty interviews with housing advocates and tenants. Results highlight the role of the municipal welfare stateöparticularly rent regulations öin mediating displacement pressures during the long housing boom. The ongoing restructuring and destabilization of rent regulations, therefore, have made a significant difference in where displaced renters are able to live. Compared with old forms of displacement at the urban core, contemporary dispossessions have become more causally diffuse in their origins and more spatially diffuse in their local manifestation.
Displacement, displaced
For half a century the dispossessions of residential displacement have been at the center of intense debate, with controversy often inversely proportional to the availability of empirical measurement. As Atkinson (2000) notes, measuring displacement is like measuring the invisible: since most social surveys are administered at place of residence, displaced households are, by definition, gone from the places where census takers go to look for them. Moreover, when people are displaced, the survival strategies they are forced to choose ö doubling up with friends or family, moving to another city, couch-surfing, slipping into homelessnessö usually render them invisible in social surveys. The only circumstances where there is not an obsessive concern with the uncertainty of numerical estimates are those places in the Global South where the scale of dispossession is undeniable: an estimated 2 million people were displaced by forced evictions across Africa between 2003 and 2006, and 3 .4 million were displaced in Asiaönot counting the million-plus pushed out to make way for Beijing's hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games (COHRE, 2006, page 11) .
In most of the Anglophone literature, however, displacement has remained closely associated with debates on gentrification in cities of the Global North (Atkinson, 1998; 2000; Butler, 2007; Hamnett, 2003; Hartman et al, 1982; Newman and Wyly, 2006; Slater, 2009; Smith, 1996; Sumka, 1979) . In the realm of theory, displacement has always been contested: some residential mobility in gentrifying neighborhoods involves direct, forced displacement, but some does not. Many household decisions fall somewhere in the middle of the ambiguous continuum between free choice and no choice. Many gentrification researchers now see displacement as an important contingent relation, rather than a fundamental, necessary relation.
In the empirical realm, displacement has often served as a barometer of reinvestmentöand of the potential for resistance and protest (Smith, 1996) . And in terms of public policy, displacement has been at the heart of disputes over public responsibility to protect vulnerable households.
Unfortunately, displacement is difficult to quantifyöhence easily ignored. In the 1960s and 1970s a cohort of meticulous researchers worked to measure the extent and consequences of displacement (for reviews, see Hartman et al, 1982; Sumka, 1979) . After this initial wave of primary research, however, the challenges of direct observation led to years of neglect. The social justice and equity concerns of those who took an interest in gentrification sustained a consensus that displacement was a serious and widespread problem. But much of the discussion of the phenomenon ebbed and flowed with the fortunes of urban real-estate markets. The issue was ignored (inappropriately) in times and places with sluggish markets (Marcuse, 1986) , and would reemerge as a major concern when boom times returned.
Destabilization
In the last decade, three trends have altered these debates. First, the long economic expansion and globalized credit boom across urban systems of the Global North drove gentrification outward from the urban core. The leveraged real-estate frenzy set the stage for an unprecedented crash and a wave of foreclosure-driven displacements across many kinds of city neighborhoods (Hackworth, 2007; Immergluck, 2009) . At the same time, transnational economic realignments and state-led redevelopment schemes transformed vast sections of the urban built environment in China, India, Brazil, and elsewhere in the Global South (Harris, 2008; Winkler, 2009 ). Contemporary urban renewal in the Global South dwarfs the bulldozed landscapes that enraged Anderson (1964) and, even in the US, the phrase is losing its stigma: Robert Moses, long viewed as the``evil genius of mid-century urban design'' (Goldberger, 2007) , was the subject of a sympathetic, three-museum retrospective in New York in the spring of 2007. All of these changes suggest that gentrification, displacement, and renewal have been respatialized and intensified in transnational urbanism.
Second, the intensification and evolution of gentrification blurred its once-clear conceptual ties to displacement. Recent debate in the UK focuses on new kinds of displacements``extending beyond the inner-city core and the working class,'' leading one analyst to challenge a``restrictive analysis (`gentrification as displacement')'' that`b y no means tells the whole story about ... new forms of sociospatial segmentation of urban centres'' (Butler, 2007, pages 162^163) . Lambert and Boddy (2002) , Hamnett (2003) , and others have documented long-term forcesödemography, housing turnover, sociospatial class restructuringöthat are so powerful and far-reaching, it is argued, that it no longer makes sense to cling to a``narrow focus on displacement'' (Hamnett, 2010, page 176) . Hamnett (2003; offers`replacement' and`succession' as more accurate descriptions of residential changes caused not by spatially focused cases of gentrification, but by much broader structural processes bound up with``the changing industrial and class structure of the city'' as a whole (Hamnett, 2010, page 181) . This work has inspired considerable debate (see Hamnett, 2010; Slater, 2009) . At the same time, a new discussion in America has raised important questions about gentrification, class, and constructions of racial and ethnic difference. The increasing wealth of part of the African American middle class over the past generation, for example, may have fostered a genuinely unique``Black gentrification'' that``is distinctive in that the middle-class gentrifiers are ... motivated to move into a neighborhood guided by a social justice agenda, with the express desire to live with low-income residents'' rather than displace them (Moore, 2009, pages 136^137) . Analysts working from this perspective offer the hope that certain kinds of gentrification may nourish mixedincome, mixed-race communities that represent the highest ideals of progressive urban policy.
Third, in a series of multivariate analyses of microlevel housing datasets, several analysts documented residential mobility patterns that challenge the consensus on the links between gentrification and displacement. Drawing on the AHS files for Boston in three periods from the 1970s and 1980s, Vigdor (2002) found that the share of housing units occupied by poor households who were subsequently replaced by the nonpoor was actually less than the share who enjoyed increases in incomes and thus became nonpoor without moving; additionally, low-status households were no more likely to move out of gentrified areas compared with other neighborhoods. Freeman and Braconi (2004) analyzed a sample of matched housing units from the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS) in the 1990s, and found that low-status households were significantly less likely to move out of gentrifying neighborhoods compared with otherwise identical low-status households living in other parts of the city. One reason offered for this finding was the protective effects of rent regulations that permitted low-income households to remain in gentrifying neighborhoods even while deregulated market rents increased. Freeman (2005) extended the analysis to large cities nationwide, using the confidential, neighborhood geocoded files of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for 1986^98. McKinnish et al (2008) analyzed confidential, microlevel long-form decennial census data for 1990 and 2000, and found similar results. Their analysis provided no evidence of disproportionate out-migration of low-education or racial minority households from gentrifying neighborhoods.
This new wave of displacement research was showcased in major press coverage, with prominent headlines like Time magazine's``Gentrification: Not Ousting the Poor'', and USA Today's``Studies: gentrification a boost for everyone''. Most coverage celebrated the apparent vindication of urban policy elites' oft-recited goal of`revitalization without displacement'. The evidence seemed to provide a green light for the continuation of growth-machine priorities. Unfortunately, most of the coverage ignored the limitations of these studies. Some critics have raised methodological questions of the operational definition of gentrifying neighborhoods and the endogeneity of displacees' responses that render them statistically invisible (Newman and Wyly, 2006) . Others have noted interpretive contradictions: Vigdor (2002) and Freeman and Braconi (2004) find that public housing and rent control both enhance residential stability, helping low-income households to resist displacement; yet the overwhelming priority of growth advocates who cite this work is to destroy public housing and`liberate' rental units from government regulations (Goetz, 2010) . Others have questioned the narrow observational epistemology of social-survey measures of displacement (Davidson, 2009) , given the crucial role of the exploitation of rent gaps and new forms of displacement in the``urban space wars'' that have become``inherent to the social architecture of capitalism'' (Hansen, 2006, page 24; see also Clark, 2005; Hackworth, 2007; Slater, 2009) . Finally, long-term indicators of housing affordability confirm that the old, spatially concentrated forms of displacement have given way to a more spatially diffuse regime of housing-market competition that favors owners, landlords, and investors at the expense of poor and working-class renters. In 1970 there were approximately 130 affordable housing units for every 100 low-income households; supply dipped below demand by 1978, and the ratio now stands at 38 (Dahmann, 2010) . For a generation, renters have been competing for a shrinking supply of affordable units. The worst off are the lowest income households who receive no federal assistance ö5.91 million renters classified as`worst-case housing needs'. These households have incomes below 50% of area median, and either pay more than half their income for rent, or live in substandard housing (US HUD, 2010).
Replacing displacement
In this paper we engage this debate with a reconsideration of the evidence. We offer three specific contributions, drawing on a combination of quantitative and qualitative evidence from New York City. First, we analyze how displacement trends changed in the boom years between 2002 and 2008, updating analyses of conditions in the 1990s (Freeman and Braconi, 2004; Newman and Wyly, 2006) . Second, we explore Vigdor's (2002) and Freeman and Braconi's (2004) findings on public policy: have recent changes in housing assistance and rent regulations altered the choices available to displaced renters? Third, we heed Butler's (2007, page 163) call to consider displacement``beyond the inner-city core'': we analyze the intraurban geography of displacement, as households adapt to a turbulent, competitive market shaped by an expansive but embattled municipal welfare state.
Our quantitative evidence comes from the occupied housing unit records of the NYCHVS (see US Bureau of the Census, 2002; 2008b) , while our qualitative evidence comes from several dozen interviews with affordable housing advocates and tenants conducted in the summer of 2003 (for further details, see Newman and Wyly, 2006) .
Displacing New York City
New York City is often regarded as a worst-case scenario for housing affordability. But if the place seems like a city-as-an-inequality-machine, certain features make it a best-case scenario. It has by far the most well-developed municipal welfare state of precisely the kind Harvey (1989) had in mind when he chronicled its decline. This is the place with``a long history as a`social welfare city,' '' the``prototypical New Deal city in the prototypical New Deal state,'' the home of a``cosmopolitan liberalism'' born from the marriage of machine politics and progressive visions of reform ö``the politics of compassion and enlightened self interest'' (all quotes from Gifford, 1978, pages 560, 562, 577) .
This history created a comparatively strong safety net for low-income and moderateincome renters. While political battles have weakened rent regulations in the past generation, the system survives. Direct and indirect displacement pressures are mediated by the state rent regulations passed in the`emergency' housing shortages of the 1940s, combined with the city's history of aggressively seeking federal funds for public housing. An assortment of other state, federal, and nonprofit programs and organizations sustain limited-equity affordable housing and other quasi-nonmarket models. As of 2008 the city's occupied housing stock is just under 3 million; one third are owner-occupied, the rest rental. Two thirds of the rental stock is covered by some kind of regulatory intervention; the restrictive formulas of rent control apply to only 1.9% of all rentals. Rent stabilization öwhich gives more power to landlords but still restricts annual rent increases through a process administered by a partially independent Rent Guidelines Boardöcovers just under half of the rental stock. Just over a tenth of the city's rentals are governed by various federal rules, either in traditional public housing or contracts with private landlords subsidized by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Unfortunately, the last twenty years have seen a steady erosion in these protections (DeFilippis and Wyly, 2008) . Demographic and market forces have also threatened the informal subsidies once provided by landlords willing to accept below-market rents because of friendship, extended family ties, and community relations (Newman and Wyly, 2006) .
The NYCHVS is conducted by the US Census Bureau to implement New York's state laws authorizing continuation of rent regulation only so long as there is a rental market emergencyödefined as a rental vacancy rate under 5%. The survey is a panel designed to be longitudinal between decennial census enumerations with respect to housing units. The sample is approximately 18 thousand units. The NYCHVS suggests that displacement peaked in the years leading up to 2005, slipping back somewhat over the subsequent three years (tables 1 and 2). This surprising result may reflect the timing of the economic collapse in 2008. The NYCHVS was conducted between February and June, before the catastrophic events of September; regional poverty estimates from the American Community Surveyöshowing no significant change from 2007 to 2008ötell a similar story (Roberts, 2009). Our portrait of displacement, therefore, shows a market on the edge, before``debt-laden properties, stalled construction, and widespread foreclosures came to define real estate in New York City'' (Armstrong et al, 2010, page 5) . Highlights of this portrait include sampling issues and the regulations of the municipal welfare state.
Sampling issues
Considering random sampling variability, the annualized displacement rates range from a minimum of about 10 000 In light of both sampling variability and nonsampling error, however, the figures for poverty and displacement must be taken as the most conservative underestimates. Consider the hidden dispossessions of evictions. In the three years before 2008, the 95% confidence interval for the number of householders who stated that they moved because of eviction ranged from 1754 to 5674; for renters in poverty the corresponding interval was from 300 to 2856. Given the sampling frame of the NYCHVS, we do not know how many evicted households became homeless, left New York City, or doubled up (thus becoming individual members of other households and disappearing from view in a survey that poses the mobility question only to the householder). But we do know from city records (City of New York, annual) that between 2005 and 2007 city marshals carried out 2634 evictions. This is a full regulatory enumeration, not a sample, and it yields a figure that is below the midpoint best-sample estimates from the NYCHVS for all renter evictions, and at the very top of the interval for poor renters. We also know that between 2005 and 2007 marshals undertook almost 67 000 additional actions called`possessions'. These differ from evictions only for the purposes of bureaucratic taxonomy. Marshalls also performed 615`ejectments' during these years öactions in which people are forcibly removed from their homes, sometimes with their children taken into custody by city social workers. From 2000 through 2008, more than 210 000 households were forced from their homes by city marshals carrying out legal notices and orders; the most liberal interpretation of the NYCHVS sample estimatesöthe upper bound of the 95% confidence intervalöstill misses twelve out of thirteen of these displacements. (Unfortunately, the city marshals' borough-level summaries cannot be directly matched with the more detailed NYCHVS data.) Others not counted include those who give up at some point during the months of preliminary legal notices and orders, and who leave before the marshals arrive. As of November 2008, 36 655 people were living in the city's municipal shelter system; a total of 109 314 people used the shelters sometime in 2008, up from 82 802 in 2002 (Coalition for the Homeless, 2008; . A recent survey found that one fifth of respondents knew someone who had become homeless in the previous six months; one fifth feared that they or their families were at risk of homelessness (ICP, 2010).
Displacing New York 2607 Table 1 . Displacement estimates for all renters, New York City (data source: US Bureau of Census, 2002; 2008b Regulatory context and the welfare state Not all of those displaced are able to remain in the city: a study commissioned by Mayor Bloomberg in 2006 found that 64% of those who moved away from the city cited housing costs as a major concern (Fernandez, 2009) . Among displacees who do manage to stay, rent protections are crucial (table 3) . While the city's protections are better than those elsewhere, state laws were weakened several times in the 1990s. Each year, more and more units approach or reach the point of`luxury decontrol', and vacancies, improvements, and other factors allow landlords to use other formulas to tack on additional rental increases. Apartments reaching rents of $2000 per month are freed from regulations once they become vacant; this provision has been in place since July 1993. Without inflation adjustment, the luxury decontrol trigger has morphed into an automatic deregulation machine, liberating units wherever strong demand pushes rents high enough. New York's governor recently cited``a chaotic housing market'' in proposing to revise the threshold to $3000, although the prospects for legislative passage are questionable (Buckley, 2010) . Tenant organizers have long understood the powerful threshold effect. A staff member at a community organization in Fort Greene explained,`T he only tenants we have right now who are in danger are in rent-stabilized housing, and the landlords [have been] harassing them for a long time to try to get them out. They increase the rent to $2000 or beyond and de-regulate. We see a lot of times where they get someone out, renovate the apartment, and move someone in for $2,500'' (interview with Fort Green organizer, 2003). If legal regulated rent exceeds $2000 per month and the tenant's total household income exceeds $175 000 per year for two consecutive years, then the unit is eligible for decontrol without vacancy. This`destabilization' provision is a product of the Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997 (State of New York, 1997),``one of the most bitter state legislative battles of the 20th Century'' (Collins, 2006, page 37) . Another provision allows city officials``to enter into contracts with developers to exempt new construction from any form of rent regulation for a period of fifty years'' (Collins, 2006, page 38) .
A steadily shrinking share of renters enjoy protection from market forces, especially when they move. Moves increase individual risk and uncertainty, while also creating vacancies that accelerate the collective loss to the renter class by creating opportunities for landlords working their way towards the deregulation threshold. Among all renters, the share of movers entering the private, unregulated market has steadily increased, exceeding 50% by 2008 (table 3). The figures are lower for poor renters and the displaced poor, but the trend is similar: by 2008 more than a third of all poor displaced renters wound up in the private, unprotected market ö only a bit less than the 39% who go into stabilized units. The share of poor displacees who gain entry to public housing ö more than a quarter in 2002ö has been halved. The share able to obtain a Housing Choice Voucher or other federal subsidy has also fallen substantially.
Interviewees in Harlem, Clinton, Park Slope, and Fort Greene all confirmed the pressures reducing the supply of affordable, regulated unitsöespecially the dwindling stock of single room occupancy (SRO) units.`P eople who previously could rent a room in an SRO for $50 or $75, those units were being changed into apartmentsötwo to a floor in a brownstone. The owner would take it, combine them, and make a floor through. In the early 1990s, these went for $1,000 [per month], now $1,500'' (interview with Harlem community leader, 2003). (2002; 2005; 2008b The erosion of protections for renters is part of the structural transformation of governance that accelerated after the crisis in the city's economic base in the 1970s allowed conservatives to weaken the municipal welfare state (Gifford, 1978; Hackworth, 2007; Harvey, 1989; Mollenkopf and Castells, 1991) . These changes also reflected the debt boom that eventually collapsed into the worst global financial crisis since the Great Depression (Immergluck, 2009; cf Krueckeberg, 1999) . Analysis of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data indicate that borrowing leverage peaked in 2005, with the city's low-cost rental market pressured and surrounded by overheated, highly leveraged ownership across a wide continuum of neighborhood social class (color plate 1). Unsurprisingly, the intense competition and prestige of Manhattan below 96th Street puts most of these neighborhoods in the stratospheric range, with typical mortgage loans eight or nine times annual incomes in 2005. But the simple division between Manhattan and the rest of the metropolis narrated so eloquently in Dual City (Mollenkopf and Castells, 1991) has clearly given way to a much more intricate topography of class, debt, and risk. High borrowing ratios appear across vast Displacing New Yorksections of the South Bronx, far eastern Queens, and much of Brooklyn. After the boom collapsed, foreclosure risk worsened across a broad spectrum of wealthy, middle-class, and working-class neighborhoods (color plate 1). The national and local debt binge intensified pressures on poor renters. Plentiful investment capital fueled a luxury development boom across much of the city, producing thousands of new units; after the crash of 2008 some of these units stand vacant or unfinished. The Right to The City coalition, an alliance of community organizations and scholars, recently launched a volunteer effort to survey neighborhoods to identify vacant properties. Preliminary efforts identified 601 vacant buildings, most of them new luxury condominiums (Ong, 2009) , and a subsequent survey identified 4092 vacant luxury units in Bushwick, the South Bronx, and several other of the city's poorest districts (Lennard, 2010) .
In a syndrome that analysts and activists have labeled`predatory equity', private equity firms responded to the shortage of new accumulation opportunities in the luxury market by speculating on the death of the welfare state. Investors pursued heavily debt-leveraged buyouts of the owners of large, rent-regulated apartment complexes. Transactions were bid upward in the boom on the basis of financial models projecting rental increases premised on the replacement of stabilized moderate-income tenants with wealthier, deregulated market-rate tenants. Predatory equity deals financed the purchase of some 90 000 units of affordable rental units (ANHD, 2008, page 2). Leverage worsened displacement on the upslope of the boom, while the neglect of building maintenance now undermines housing services after the boom collapsed; more than half of the affordable rental units in predatory equity deals were vulnerable to risky commercial loans placed on loan servicers' watch lists; some of these projects subsequently slipped into foreclosure (ANHD, 2008, page 2).
Origins and destinations`f orced displacement is ... a case of people without the economic and political power to resist being pushed out by people with greater resources and power ... . The pushers benefit. The pushees do not.' ' Hartman et al (1982, page 4) Where are the pushees going? Is it possible to map displacement in order to evaluate Butler's (2007, page 163) suggestion of new displacements that are``now extending beyond the inner-city core and the working class''? One of the items added to the NYCHVS in 2005 makes this possible for the first time, by identifying movers' previous residences by fifty-five``subborough areas'' across the city. Origin/destination ratios measure displacement pressures across the city's diverse, spatialized class structure (table 4, color plate 2). Strongly positive ratios appear for the long-gentrified bastions of Greenwich Village and the Financial District (1.58) and for the upper middle-class quarters of the Upper West Side (2.07). But nine of the top-ten ratios highlight working-class and lower-middle class areasö including those places like Stuyvesant Town, Co-op City, and Starrett City with some of the nation's largest remaining concentrations of affordable housing protected by subsidies and regulations. These ratios suggest that the upscale public and private gentrification waves that have pushed outward from the traditional confines of the urban core (Hackworth and Smith, 2001 ) have evolved through buyouts pursued by developers pushing destabilization. The local contours of displacement have changed (figure 2), with the familiar push outward from Lower Manhattan now joined by a broad arc across the mid-city belt of the outer boroughs. Pressures are apparent not only in the established gentrification enclaves of Park Slope, but through a crescent extending all the way from Sunset Park through East New York, Kew Gardens, Hillcrest, and the diverse transnational communities of Elmhurst and Corona. Net`exports' also come from Mott Haven, Hunts Point, and Co-Op City in the Bronx. At the other extreme, some parts of the city serve as destinations for those who are displaced (but who still manage to remain in the city). Many displacees find their way to the far northern reaches of Manhattan (Morningside Heights and Washington Heights) or to the more distant zones of the outer boroughs, as far away as Coney Island, the South Shore of suburbanesque Staten Island, and the Rockaways. It is crucial to recognize, however, that the origin/destination ratio measures only the proportional balance, not total mobility. In the middle of the ranked list are neighborhoods with a great deal of`churning' ö places where many people are forced out even as many others find refuge. A fifth of renters citywide who moved from Bedford-Stuyvesant were displaced. Almost a third of those moving to Bed-Stuy were displaced.
A multivariate assessment
The new origin data in the NYCHVS make it possible to study the multivariate interactions between household and regulatory factors at the intraurban scale. We used the NYCHVS records for occupied housing units across the city to build a database for all renters moving into their current unit sometime in the previous three years for the 2005 and 2008 surveys. Separate sets of variables measure (a) household demographics, (b) housing stock and affordability characteristics, and rent regulation protections, and (c) explicitly contextual measures of the spatial reorganization of housing intervention. The latter measures are created by aggregating occupied housing unit characteristics to the subborough area, to capture variations and changes in the supply of traditional public housing, private rental housing protected by rent stabilization and other affordability regulations, and owner-occupied housing. Each of these indicators is measured for the area where a mover currently lives, and the most recent area where they lived for at least six months. The six displacement-related reasons enable the classification of moves as voluntary or forced; this dichotomy is then taken as the dependent variable for logistic regressions. Household weights in the NYCHVS incorporate the Census Bureau's postsurvey adjustments for undersampling and oversampling. Simply weighting the models, however, would multiply all results by a large factor (each sampled unit represents, on average, 185 households), spuriously reducing standard errors. To avoid this bias, new adjustment factors are calculated by dividing each household's weight by the mean value for all households in each survey year.
Results
The proximate correlates of displacement involve a wide variety of individual, household, and neighborhood circumstancesöand even with the best data we can`see' only a few of these relations. Thus it is not surprising that models achieve relatively low predictive power for all renters; for those in poverty, however, fit is approximately three times stronger than for renters overall (table 5) . Results highlight four issues. First, it is worth emphasizing what does not seem to matter. None of the variables for race and ethnicity, and almost none of the indicators for household composition, attains statistical significance. This result defies expectations from the literature (Hartman et al, 1982; Smith, 1996; Sumka, 1979) . Several considerations are important. The interwoven relations of urban life should not be obscured by the illusory cleanliness of a multivariate test. The coefficients test whether householders' racial and ethnic identification, and household composition matter after considering all other controls in the model. Insignificant estimates do not mean that race, gender, or family structure are irrelevantöjust that they are inextricably bound up with other circumstances. The simple unconditional univariate figures do conform to expectations. Among poor renters who moved in the 2005^08 period, the displacement rate for married couples with children under 18 was 15.5%; for female-headed households with other household members (but no children under 18) the rate was 27%. During the same period 17.3% of non-Hispanic African American renters in poverty moved because of forced displacement; this figure was more than seven times the proportion for poor non-Hispanic Whites. The statistical insignificance of these disparities in the full model may signify racial inequalities narrowing among renters after the subprime boom pushed many minorities into precarious homeownership (Immergluck, 2009) even while conditions continued to worsen for low-income renters of all races and ethnicities (US HUD, 2010). Additionally, household composition is determined partly by how people and families cope with high housing costs and displacementö that is, this variable is endogenous. Unfortunately, the structure of the survey (which poses the reason-for-moving question to only one person per household) renders further investigation impossible.
A second set of results highlights a consistent and reliable predictor. For both the 2002^05 and the 2005^08 periods, and for poor renters as well as for all renters, Displacing New York 2615 householder age is a positive and statistically significant determinant. Its effects have strengthened. For poor renters in the 2005^08 period the median age for displaced renters was a full decade beyond that of those moving for all other reasons (46 versus 35). Displacement disparities increase dramatically with householder age, and its persistent significance after accounting for all other factors echos qualitative findings. In our interviews with residents and community leaders in 2003, older women were consistently identified as being at heightened risk. A Brooklyn Community Development staff member (2003) explained:`T here was a wave of gentrification in the late 1990s. Before that there was a trickle of old ladies getting evicted. By the late 1990s it was overwhelming.'' Another interviewee explained:`p robably 40 to 50% of the people experiencing eviction or harassment day-to-day are seniors. There is one woman who keeps calling me. She lives in a rent-stabilized unit and the landlord is constantly filing these frivolous filings with city and state agencies. The woman is always saying,`I gotta leave. I can't take this anymore' '' (interview with tenant advocate, 2003). Third, some of the results highlight restructuring of rent protections and household adjustments. For the 2002^05 period rent stabilization and other protections in renters' current homes do not significantly distinguish forced and voluntary moves, after accounting for householder age and other factors. This is not entirely unexpected, given the breadth of middle-class rental subsidies for which New York has always been famous (and also because our model includes other measures of housing-market protection). By 2005^08, however, the market changed. Recent movers living in rent-stabilized units are less likely to have been displaced. Perhaps the turbulent market of this period encouraged middle-class households to compete more aggressively for rent-stabilized units, thus crowding out the truly disadvantaged displacees. The results for poor renters in 2005^08 offer some circumstantial evidence, because while rent protection measures are not significant, the indicators of housing tradeoffs are. Poor households with rent-to-income burdens a standard deviation above the mean are 1.8 times more likely to have been displaced. Significant estimates also appear for larger households, while turning negative for the persons-per-room indicator. These results imply that, compared with other poor renters, displacees are more likely to crowd into larger households and to devote greater shares of their income to housing ö even as they gain access to somewhat less crowded living arrangements. Displaced households may be searching farther afield in the lower density`outer city' to find suitable homes.
Finally, the fourth set of findings addresses the relations between household adjustments and public policy. Although the rent-stabilization status of renters' current housing unit does not help us to distinguish voluntary movers from displacees, rent-regulation status is decisive in understanding where in the city households are able to move. Taken as a group, the market measures for the subborough areas where renters moved from and to (at the bottom of table 5) are crucial. But the specific patterns varied over time, suggesting considerable dynamism in the spatiality of displacement pressures and of available rentals that displacees are able to find. The relations are strongest between 2002 and 2005. Renters who lived in 2005 in parts of the city where the protected rental housing stock and public housing increased ö or declined at a slower paceöwere much more likely to have been displaced. This effect is particularly important for poor renters. Consider a subborough area where the loss rate for the protected rental stock was a standard deviation above averageöor a loss rate at least 5.3% slower than average. This would be roughly the kind of change experienced by renters moving out of Stuyvesant Town/Turtle Bay, where protected rentals collapsed by 10.7%, and choosing among several different parts of the city: a preferred area like Greenwich Village (loss rate of 11.3%) versus other options in Bushwick, Brooklyn (À4X4%), Central Harlem (À4X6%), or Bayside and Little Neck, Queens (À6X3%). All else constant, renters who wind up in the parts of the city with the slower pace of deregulationöBushwick, Central Harlem, Bayside ö are more than twice as likely as otherwise identical renters to report being forced to move. Citywide, the protected rental stock has been shrinking for years. Still, the protected share remains over 55%, and covers more than a million rentals; the share, and its rate of change, vary widely across the city. Similarly, public housing has generally remained stable, at 8.8% of all occupied units citywide in 2002, 8.3% in 2005, and 8.5% in 2008 , even as federal and local policies have led to dramatic reductions in some neighborhoods and significant increases elsewhere. Consider poor renters moving out of Central Harlem, where the public housing share slipped by 0.9% in 2002^05, and choosing between Washington Heights and Inwood, where public housing is rare (less than 3% of occupied units) and East New York and Starrett City (which posted a slight gain, putting the area a standard deviation better than Central Harlem). All else constant, poor renters who wind up in East New York or Starrett City are 1.4 times more likely to report having been forced to move from their previous home.
A Brooklyn community leader explained what constraints like these meant for individual families:`I was homeless for four months. Sometimes people double up, but when you have kids that's hard to do. Either people go into shelters or they go into worse-off neighborhoods where who knows ... '' (interview with Brooklyn community leader, 2003) . The community leader explained how, in her view, poor families only really had three options: (1) living with friends or family; (2) moving into shelters, or (3) moving to a lower income neighborhood. Moves to lower income communities often entail other kinds of costs. The community leader described the situation of one tenant:`I f you're a single parent, it's hard. She went through a lot. She had to buy a car and had insurance payments. But mainly the hard part was because she had to put on this fac°ade so that her kids wouldn't feel bad. They just thought they were moving. They didn't realize why'' (interview with Brooklyn community leader, 2003) . Those parts of the city where deregulation is proceeding more slowly have become important spaces of refuge. At the same time, the contours of the credit and homeownership boom narrowed the choices available to renters. All else constant, increasing the subborough homeownership rate by 2.57% (versus the average citywide expansion of 0.74%) cuts the chances of a displaced poor renter living in that area by half. This effect is moderated somewhat for renters overall, but it still persists (odds ratio of 0.85). Moreover, changing conditions in the neighborhoods where renters moved from prove significant for renters as a class. Renters who moved out of areas with ownership rates that increased 2% faster than average were, all else constant, 1.25 times more likely to report being displaced.
These relations changed over the next three years. For renters overall, displaced movers were less likely than voluntary movers to live in zones with greater supplies of protected rentals or public housingöa surprising reversal from the earlier pattern. The results for renters in poverty, however, are only surprising if we ignore the paradoxical environment created by the housing boom and the long-running reinvention of assisted housing (Goetz, 2010; Hackworth, 2007) . At first glance, it is surprising to see the strong, positive, significant odds ratio implying that stable or expanded supplies of public housing push displaced poor renters out (1.78). But this effect is consistent with what is known about the exclusionary admissions policies and local gentrification pressures that typically follow public housing`revitalization' (Goetz, 2010) . Local contingencies also matter: the part of the city with the largest net growth in occupied public housing between 2005 and 2008 has also been widely recognized as a site of significant reinvestment and displacement: Central Harlem.
Conclusions`S o-called`urban renewal' programs provide some compensation for the properties they take, but no compensation is possible for the subjective value of these lands to the individuals displaced and the indignity inflicted by uprooting them from their homes.'' Thomas (2005, page 17)`T he task for critical urban studies is to reject the celebration of gentrification and the denial of displacement by reorienting the debate away from the positivist humdrum of independent variables drawn from survey categories (legitimised by appeals to`policy relevance'), and towards a sturdier analytical, political, and moral framework which is rooted in housing as a question of social justice, and in particular, housing as a human right and a basic human need.' ' Slater (2009, page 306, original emphasis) One of the most effective tactics of neoliberalism involves the statistical disappearance of its costs and victims. Yet even if the`numbers' often are made to mislead, we have a responsibility to engage rigorously with the data at hand and highlight what is missing. Our evidence helps to re-place displacement, and to make it visible. More than half a century after the heyday of the federal bulldozer, the US Supreme Court's Kelo decision upheld the authority of local governments to use the Constitution's takings clause to seize private property for public purposesöeven when the public purpose involves turning property over to private corporations promising enhanced citywide economic development. Justice Clarence Thomas's (2005) angry dissent was echoed within a few years by the legislatures of forty-five states that moved to restrict their eminent domain statutes (Burke, 2006) . Nationwide estimates from the AHS indicate that in the year prior to 2007, approximately 7 000 homeowners like Susette Kelo reported moving from their previous residence because of government displacement. For every Susette Kelo whose dispossession enrages strict-constructionist jurists and legislators, however, 11 renters were displaced by government action, another 11 were evicted, 19 were displaced by disaster, 65 were forced to leave by private landlords, and 117 had to move to find a more affordable place to live (US Bureau of the Census, 2008a, page 76). In New York City, at least 10 000 renter households are displaced each yearöa tip of the iceberg that includes many who leave the city, become homeless, double up with friends or relatives, or adapt in other ways that render them statistically invisible. These estimates also exclude at least 20 000 annual dispossessions that are not counted as`evictions' because of legalistic classification. Moreover, in late September 2010, it was announced that 20 000 formerly rent-stabilized units in the 2008 NYCHVS were actually unregulated rental unitsömeaning that the pace of deregulation documented in our analysis is a significant underestimate (US Bureau of the Census, 2010). Among those displaced who manage to remain in the city, rent regulations help mediate landlord^tenant relations. This component of the municipal welfare state survives ö at least in New York and some other places. Its spatial reorganization has direct and measurable effects on where displaced renters are able to live. Measuring these effects yields maps that can and should be used to support the message of the right to the city, and to mobilize for its achievement (Harvey, 2008) . 2620 E Wyly, K Newman, A Schafran, E Lee
